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Abstract
To explore the link between a tighter environmental policy and economic growth, we
employ an endogenous growth model in which the envirotunent acts as a public
consumption good and a public capital good. Three types of capital are included: public
knowledge about pollution-saving technologies, private man-made capital, and natural
capital. The entire transition towards a new balanced growth path following a tightening
of environmental policy is computed analytically. We find sharp contrasts between short-
run and long-run effects. To illustrate, whereas the level and the growth rate of output
may decline in the short run, income growth may improve in the long run. The paper also
performs explicit welfare analysis and develops a green concept of income, which
accounts for investment in natural capital and the imputed income from environmental
amenities.t
1. Introduction
How environmental policy affects economic growth is a controversial issue. Industrialists
typically argue that environmental policy hurts grow[h by raising production costs.
Environmentalists, in contrast, maintain that environmental policy is needed in order to
ensure that growth is sustainable. This paper employs an endogenous growth model to
explore the link between environmental policy and economic growth. We use the two-
sector endogenous growth model developed by Bovenberg and Smulders (1993). In this
model, economic activity depends on three types of assets: first, natural capital, second,
knowledge about pollution-saving technologies, and, third, other man-made capital.
Environmental quality acts both as a public consumption good and a public capital
good. In particular, as a consumption good, the envirotunent yields environmental
amenities. As a capital good, it enhances the productivity of man-made inputs into
production. We show that the economic effects of a tighter environmental policy depend
crucially on whether the benefits of a cleaner environment accrue in the form of amenities
or a higher productivity of the production processes.
Whereas Bovenberg and Smulders (1993) analyze only the long-run impact of
environmental policy, we inves[igate the entire transition towards a new balanced-growth
path. Our analysis reveals that short-run impacts may contrast quite sharply with long-run
effects. For ezample, environmental policy may hurt short-run growth but enhance
growth in the long run. We also find that the adjustment path for particular variables may
be non-monotonic. To illustrate, production may rely more on pollution-saving
technologies only temporarily. Eventually, the accumulation of other man-made assets
may dominate [he accumulation of pollution-saving knowledge and in the long run the
economy may become more capital-intensive as indicated by a higher ratio of capital to
(pollution-saving) knowledge.
The analysis of the transition towards a new steady state enables us also [o
perform welfare analysis of environmental policy. In particular, we make explicit the
trade off between short-run costs and long-tetm benefits of environmental policy. In this
connection, we extend the concepts of green income developed by Hartwick (1990) and
Máler (1990) to models of endogenous growth and distorted market economies in which
environmental policy is not necessarily optimal. Our concept of green income accounts
for both the accumulation of natural capital and the imputed income from environmental
amenities and thus measure permanent (or sustainable) income.
This paper contributes also to the literature on endogenous growth. Almost all this
literature deals only with long-run impacts and ignores the transition towards a new
balanced-growth path. Exceptions are Chamley (1993), Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
(1993), and Cabellé and Santos (1993) who analyze the transition in endogenous-growthz
models with two types of capital. We extend their analysis to models with three assets,
namely not only physical capital and knowledge but also natural capital. Moreover, in
contrast to Chamley (1993) and Cabellé and Santos (1993), we explore shocks that affect
the long-tetm growth rate. Furthermore, whereas Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993)
resort to numerical simulations, we solve the transition analytically by employing a
iinearization method developed by Judd (1982). We extend this method for computing
comparative dynamics to endogenous growth models and to welfare functions with non-
statiottary arguments.
Our analyses diverges in two additional ways from Bovenberg and Smulders
(1993). First, Bovenberg and Smulders (1993) emphasize the command optimum. Our
present analysis, in contrast, focuses on a decentralized economy with a sub-optimal
environmental policy. In particular, we emphasize the case in which environmental policy
is tightened starting from an initial equilibrium in which pollution is excessive compared
to ttte socially optimal level. In this context, we develop the concept of a distortionary,
implicit subsidy on pollution. Hence, our analysis is closer to the literature on policy
reform than to that on optimal policy. A final difference with Bovenberg and Smulders
(1993) is that we allow envirotunental quality to improve productivity in both production
sectors included in the model.
Our paper is structured as follows. Following a description of the main features of
the model in section 2, section 3 deals with the initial balanced growth path. It describes
the requirements for balanced endogenous growth, provides some important steady-state
relationships, introduces a green concept of income, and, finally, develops the concept of
a distortionary pollution subsidy to describe sub-optimal environmental policy in the
initial steady state. How the comparative dynamics of a tighter environmental policy can
be solved analytically is explained in section 4. Section 5, the main body of the paper,
provides the analytical solutions for a number of major variables including welfare and
the time paths of consumption, income, the income share of the public sector, and the
three assets. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2. The model
This section describes the dynamic general eyuilibrium model visualised in Figure l.
Table lA and 1B contain the model in mathematical form.'
"' insert Figure 1 ~`~'
' All symbols are explained in table 4 at the end of the paper.3
2.1. Structure of the economy
The representative consumer maximizes utility over an infinite horiZOn (see (1.1)). She
cares about not only consumption (c) but also environmental ameni[ies.
The quality of the environment (N, e.g. the cleanliness of the air, of the soil, etc.)
is modelled as a renewable resource (see (1.2)). It is renewable through natural
regeneration processes which allow for growth in environmental quality. However, the
larger the stock of natural capital and environmental quality, the more difficult it is to
regenerate the complete stock. In other words, natural capital accumulation features
diminishing returns2. Envirotunental quality deteriorates through extractive use in
production. In particular, production requires inpu[s that pollute the envirotiment (e.g.,
pesticides in agriculture, fossil fuels resulting in emissions of carbon) or that directly
harvest nature (e.g., water, wildlife, fish, wood, etc.). This extractive use of the
environment is called pollution and denoted by P. The pollution-assimilating and self-
generation capacities of the ecological system enables the envirotunent to digest a certain
flow of pollution without deteriorating in quality. Hence, the environment allows for a
sustainable flow of pollution, which matches the biological regeneration rate of the
ecological system. If the flow of pollution is relatively small (but constant), natural
regeneration and growth processes outweigh the adverse effects of pollution so that
environmental quality gradually rises over time. Due to the diminishing returns in natural
regeneration, environmental quality eventually stabilizes at a long-run equilibrium level
N(P). As a consequence, a long-run negative relationship exists between, on the one
hand, the flow of pollution and, on the other hand, the stock of environment quality'.
The quality of the environment not only boosts welfare as an amenity (N is an
argument of the utility function (1.1)), but also enhances the productivity of man-made
inputs by providing non-extractive services (see (1.3) and (1.4), where the productivity
terms AY and A„ depend positively on N). Examples of these services are the carrier
services of the environment, which provide physical and mental support to produciive
activities (e.g., the impact of soil and air quality on productivity in the agricultural sector,
the effect of air quality on mental health, labor productivity, and physical depreciation of
equipment). In providing these non-extractive services, the environment is a non-rival
good: it provides amenities to each household and at the same time boosts productivity in
both production sectors. In it's role as an environmental amenity, the quality of the
2 This implies that the first derivative of the natural growth function in (1.2) is
negative with respect to N for large values of N (i.e. ENGO around ÍV(P)).
' Very high levels of pollution always damage environmental quality, i.e N(P) only
exists for PGP,„n,. Hence, sustainability requires PGP,,,~. We consider such interior
solutions only.4
environment acts as a public consumption good. In enhancing the productiviry of man-
made inputs, in contrast, it is a public capital good.
Production requires rival production factors (i.e. private capital K) and rival inputs
extracted from nature, which are measured in efficiency units (Z). Private capital should
be interpreted broadly. It includes various kinds of private capital that can be produced.
Accordingly, it includes not only physical but also human capital. No production is
feasible without the extractive use of the environment (i.e. pollution, P). However,
pollu[ion-saving technological progress is possible; [he larger the stock of knowledge
about pollution-saving technologies, the more productive inputs extracted from nature
become. In particular, denoting the s[ock of pollution-saving technical knowledge by h
and the flow of polluting inputs by P, we can represent the extractive use of the
environment in efficiency units by Z-hP.
The economy can invest in three types of assets. In particular, by reducing
pollution, it can accumulate more natural capital, N. Alternatively, resources can be
devoted to private capital investment (K). Finally, additional pollution-saving technologies
(h) can be developed. In contrast to natural capital, the latter two assets are man-made (or
produced or reproducible). K is produced according to the same technology as
consumption goods in the Y-sector (which we alternatively name the consumption-goods
or private capital-goods sector, see (1.3)). A separate sector (the H-sector, which we will
also call the environmental RBzD sector or the knowledge sector, see (1.4)) develops
pollution-saving technologies. The production system thus consists of two sectors: the Y-
sector and the H-sector, respectively.
Knowledge is a non-rival good: one idea can be applied by various firms at the
same time. The non-rival character of N an h contrasts with the rival nature of K and Z.
Non-rivalry gives rise to externalities. In particular, pollution-saving technical knowledge
is a public good, which should be provided by a public agency". Moreover, since N is a
non-rival good, producers fail to take into account the adverse effects of pollution on the
ecological system. Accordingly, the economy generates excessive pollution unless the
government intervenes. We assume that the government charges a price for pollution by
selling pollution penniu.
2.2. Behaviour and markets
Table 1B summarius the interaction of optimizing households and firms in a
decentralized market economy. Producers maximize profits by selecting the input levels
of private capital K and pollution P. Accordingly, the marginal retutn on polluting inputs
' h can also be interpreted as a public stock of abatement capital. In contrast to
Barco (1990), public investment enters production as a stock rather than a flow.5
P equals [he price of a pollution permit TP (see (1,9)5). Furthermore, the marginal return
on capital K amounts to the rate of return on capital markets, r (see (1.10)). The market
mechanism determines how capital and pollution permits are allocated over the two
production sectors. In particular, arbitrage in the capital market and the market for
pollution permits ensures that capital and pollution earn the same return in both sectors
(see (1.7) and (1.8)).
Consumers maximize intertemporal utility by choosing a consumption path such
that the return on an additional unit of postponed consump[ion equals the marginal utility
of current consumption (according to the well-known Keynes-Ramsey rule, see (1.11)).
The government decides on the number of pollution permits. This number is
optimal if the marginal benefit from an additional unit of pollution, arising from its
immediate productive value in the production sectors, is equal to the social marginal cost,
arising from its adverse effect on the ecological system (see (1.13))6 The latter depends
on the shadow price of environmental quality, qN, which reflects all future benefits of an
additional unit of natural capital N, discounted at the rate of return on alternative
investments r(see the no-arbitrage condition (1.14)).
An environmental agency auctions off the pollution permits and uses the revenues
to finance research and development in pollution-saving technical knowledge. The net
cash-flow of the agency is transferred to households, who can be viewed as the
shareholders of the agency. The objective of the environmental agency is to maximize the
net cash-flows. It takes the number of pollution perirtits, which is determined by the
government, as given. The single instrument of the agency is the price of pollution-saving
technological knowledge, q,,, which can be interpreted as the subsidy that the agency
grants for the development of pollution-saving technologies. The optimal subsidy takes
account of the future benefits of an additional unit of knowledge, discounted at the rate of
return on alternative investments r, (see the no-arbitrage condition (1.12)).
2.3. Requirements for balanced growth
Under certain conditions, the economy grows along a balanced growth path in the long
run. Hence, long-run growth in output can be ecologically sustainable. Moreover, the
long-run growth rate depends on preferences, technology, and environmental policy, and
is thus endogenous.
5 We take the price of the output from the Y-sector as the numeraire. Hence, Tp, q,,,
and qN are measured in terms of consumption goods (or private capital goods).
6 In discussing environmental policy in section 5, we assume that the number of
pollution permi[s is set exogenously rather than endogenously according to (1.13). See
sub-section 4.1.6
We assume that sufficient conditions for balanced endogenous growth are met (see
Bovenberg and Smulders (1993) for an extensive discussion of these conditions). In
particular, intertemporal utility features a constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution,
a~, and a unitary elas[icity of substitution between environmental amenities and
consumption of produced goods. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution (a~) is
assumed [o be smaller than one, as commonly found in empirical studies. The production
functions in both production sectors exhibit constant retutns to scale with respect to
capital and effective pollution. The substitution elasticities between these two inputs into
production (aY and ay) are smaller than one. This implies that production cannot take
place without pollution. Hance, (effective) pollution is an essential input. Finally, we take
the plausible position that the Y-sector is pollution-intensive and the H-sector is capital-
intensive (i.e. ~3~c~ where Q(,a) is the output share of private capital in the H-sector
(,Y-sector)).
On a balanced-growth path, the resource shares allocated to both production
sectors are constant (i.e. KyIK and ZXIZ are constant over time). The man-made capital
stocks (i.e. K, h) and the consumption of produced goods, c, grow at a common positive
growth rate (g 10). This rate of growth is directly related to the rate of return on
investment (r) by the so-called Ramsey rule (see (1.11'):
g - o .(~ - e). (1)
The growth rate is high if the long-run rate of return substantially exceeds the pure rate
of time preference (t9), especially if consumers are willing to substitute consumption
intertemporally (i.e. a~ high). The long-run rate of retum may exceed the rate of time
preference because production features constant returns with respect to the reproducible
factors of production.
On a balanced growth path, the stock of natural capital, N, and the extractive use
of the environment, P, in contrast, are constant over time and thus do not grow. As a
consequence, compared to man-made capital, natural capital and polluting inputs in
production become increasingly scarce. In particular, on a balanced growth path, the
(shadow) prices (in terms of the consumption good) of both pollution permits, rP, and
environmental quality, qN, increase at the growth rate g. The price for pollution-saving
technologies, q,,, remains constant in the long run, because knowledge about these
technologies can be accumulated at the same rate as other produced goods.
The third columns in tables lA and 1B contain the balanced-growth versions of the
behavioral equations, applying the conditions for balanced growth and the symbols
defined in table 4.3. Conventional and green concepts of income
In order to address issues of economic growth, it is necessary to aggregate the two-sector
structure of the model. This section discusses two alternative aggregation procedures
which provide macro-economic indicators. The first, conventional, procedure aggregates
man-made production, asse[s and income. The second, "green", procedure accounts for
the accumulation of natural capital and the imputed income from environmental amenities.
3.1. Conventional aggregation
The aggregate values (in terms of consumption goods) of man-made assets and national
product arc defined as:
4nrM - K f qhh,
4r~-Y} qnH-K-FCf9~




where M and J denote man-made assets and aggregate output and qM and q~ are the price
deflators in terms of consumption goods. National product amounts to the aggregate
output produced by the two production sectors, see (3). It equals national income, which
is defined as aggregate factor payments, see (4).
Aggregate consumption (C), national income, and man-made wealth are related in
the following way (see Appendix A):
Gq~,M - r - g, (g)
4~~4MM - r. (6)
Consumers' income consists of the return on the holding of private capital K(which
includes their human capital) and the revenues collected by the environmental agency.
These latter revenues from selling pollution pennits coincide with the return on the stock
of pollution-saving technological knowledge.' Hence, disposable permanent income is
' As shareholders of the public environmental agency, households collect a return
consisting of two parts. First, they receive the net cash-flow of the public environmental
agency. Second, they benefit from its retained earnings which are used to finance8
r(Kf q,,h) ~rM, which gives rise to (6). Expression (5) reveals that the part of permanent
income that remains after investment (in both man-made assets), (r-g)M, is consumed.
The following ratios characterize the importance of the public environmental
agency relative to aggregate variables:
Kx ( (1-a)tB l - 1
K- l ar t(Q -a)81g
-u , (~)
Z - (1 j~lg - 1-v,
TPP r l TPP q~Hl - r-g
(8)
(9)
A higher growth rate boosts the proportion of aggregate rival inputs (K and ~ devoted to
the environmental RBcD sector (see (7) and (8)). The reason is that higher growth shifts
economic activity away from the sector producing consumption goods (i.e. the Y-sector)
towards the sector producing only investment goods (i.e. the H-sector). The more
pollution-intensive the Y-sector is (i.e. the larger the production share of polluting inputs,
1-a, is), the more valuable pollution-saving technologies become, and thus a larger share
of economy-wide capital is devoted to the environmental RBtD sector (see (7)).
Equation (9) reveals that the public environmental agency enjoys a positive cash
flow because it collects more revenue from the sale of pollution permits (r~, than it
needs for subsidizing environmental RBZD (q,,fl). Intuitively, the returns on the investment
activities of the environmental agency correspond to the revenues from the sale of
pollution permits. In particular, by investing in pollution-saving technology, the
productivity of polluting inputs increases, thereby raising the price of pollution permits.
The agency eams a sufficient return if a positive fraction of the return, equal to the
consumption share of national product (see (5)), is paid out to households so that it can be
environmental RBcD. The overall return equals the revenues from the pollution permits.
Combining (1.4'), (1.8'), (1.9'), and (1.12'), one arrives at rPP - rq,,h. Intuitively,
pollution and pollution-saving technology are equally productive. Thus, the marginal
product of pollution, which profit-maximizing producers set equal to the price of a
pollution permit, measures the return on pollution-saving technology, which the environ-
mental agency sets equal to the return on capital, r.9
consumed.e
Two final indicators for the importance of the environmental RBcD sector in the
aggregate economy are the share of pollution-saving knowledge (h) in the aggregate value
of man-made assets, denoted by m, and the share of national product generated in the
environmental H-sector.
qhh rPP (1-a)r - ~,
9MM - 4~ - r`(~ -a)8
4~,H - ( (1-a)8 1 - ~8
q~.l l rt(Q -a)g J r
(10)
The asset share of polluting-saving knowledge capital equals the production share of
pollution because both P and h raise effective pollution, Z, and thus share the same
productivity (see (10)). Since the Y-sector is pollution intensive (i.e. Q ~ a), the
production share of pollution in the Y-sector 1- a, exceeds the corresponding aggregate
share, ca. This is especially so if the rate of growth is large compared to the rate of
return. In that case, investment is important compared to consumption and hence the
capital-intensive H-sector, which is a pure investment sector, becomes more important
compared to the pollution-intensive Y-sector, which also produces consumer goods. The
income share of the environmental RB~D sector is large also if pollution is an impotYant
input into production (i.e. 1-a large and (3 small). Comparison of (10) and (11) reveals
that the share of environmental knowledge in man-made assets (i.e. q,,h~q„~11~ exceeds the
output share of the environmental RBcD sector (i.e. q,,Hlq~. The reason for the relatively
small output share of the H-sector is that consumption goods are produced only in the Y-
sector.
3.2. "Green" concepts of income and wealth
Conventional income concepts measure only consumption of produced goods and
investment in man-made capital. They thus ignore both investments in natural capital and
the imputed income from consumption of environmental amenities. An alternative,
"green" concept of income that accounts for these 'natural' components of income can be
8 Indeed, this fraction should be positive, otherwise consumers, in their role of
shareholders of the agency, would never receive a dividend from the agency and
investment in the agency's assets would thus be worthless.lo
defined as (see, e.g., Hartwick (1990)):
4QQ - 4.~ ' UNN ,. qNN -(C.K) t q~H t UNN t qNIV,
Uc U~
(12)
Hence, green income supplements conventional income by (U„JU~)N, which represents the
imputed income associated with the consumption of environmental amenities, and by q„N,
which s[ands for investment in environmental quality. T'he imputed income from
environmental amenities is directly related to physical consumption through the parameter




Hence, in the long-run run, conventional income substantially understates green income if
environmental amenities are important, as reflected by a large value of ~:
4~ r
4QQ - ~(r~) t r
C rg
9QQ - ~(r~) f r
(14)
(15)
In analogy of a green income concept, a green measure of wealth can be defined. Such a
wealth concept incorporates not only man-made but also natural assets (i.e. environmental
quality): q,~Nfq„JV. The steady-state value of natural capital relative to that of man-made
capital follows from equation (1.14):
qNN ~(r -g) t aNr
qMM - r -g ;d
where
(16)
9 This ratio is constant if the intratemporal elasticity of substitution in utility
between consumption and environmental quality is unity. Since this is a requirement for
balanced growth, we assumed this condition to hold.11
Y qhH
aN - q~ QY t( q~ aA.
The terms in the nominator in (16) represent the contribution of an additional unit of
natural capital to, respectively, environmental amenities and production. In particular,
environmental quality provides economic services as a public consumption good because
it directly provides utility as an amenity (i.e. N directly enters utility: ~ 10). Hence,
naturai capital is valuable relative to man-made capital if the consumption to man-made
capital ratio (r-g) is large and if environmental quality plays an important role in utilíty
(i.e. ~ large).
Environmental quality provides services also as a public capital good by enhancing
total factor productivity. aN stands for the elasticity of total factor productivity in the
economy with respect to environmental quality and thus captures the importance of
environmental quality as a public capital good. In particular, it is the sum of the
corresponding elasticities in the Y-sector and the H-sector [aY~(dA,JdN)(NIA,.) and
aH ~(dA„IdN)(N~A„)] weighted by the respective income shares of the two sectors. Hence,
the more powerful environmental quality is in enhancing productivity (i.e. aN large), the
more important natural capital is compared to man-made capital.'o
4. Environmental Policy
We employ the model to examine the effects of an exogenous reduction in the number of
pollution permits. This experiment represents an environmental policy reform aimed at
internalising pollution externalities. This particular shock allows for an analytical solution
of the entire transition path as explained below.
4.1. The sub-optimality of the initial equilibrium
Policy makers argue that a tightening of environmental policy is needed in order to more
fully correct adverse pollution externalities. Accordingly, we take as the starting point of
our policy experiment an initial balanced-growth path in which pollution is excessive.
"' The relative value of natural capital declines with the sensitivity of natural capital
accumulation with respect to environmental quality, d--EN. A large value for S implies
that natural capital depreciates rapidly. This makes the accumulation of natural capital
more costly and thus increases the gross discount rate used for discounting future
benefits, thereby reducing [he value of natural capital.12
Hence, in the initial steady state, the govemment has allowed the environmental agency to
sell too many pollution petmits. In terms of our model, this implies that the number of
pollution permits, and hence pollution (P), is exogenously determined by the government.
Optimality condition (1.13) for the optimal number of pollution permits is then violated:
Tp C -EpqN,
This inequality can be rewritten as (use (6), the second equality in (10), and ó--EN):
d a a( qNN l- 1






~ can be interpreted as the gap between, on the one hand, the social costs of pollution,
and, on the other hand, the social benefits. Hence, it respresents an implicit, distortionary
subsidy wedge on pollution: pollution is provided at too low a price. Alternatively, one
can view ~ as an implicit, distortionary tax wedge on natural capital.
Expression (19) reveals under what conditions a certain (arbitrarily choosen) level
of pollution results in a large implicit pollution subsidy. In particular, E is the elasticity
(in absolute value) of long-run environmental quality with respect to the level of pollution
(e~-(aNlaP)(PIN), see (1.2)). If a small sustained reduction in P boosts environmental
quality substantially (i.e. E large), the benefits associated with higher environmental
quality are likely to outweigh the costs associated with a lower level of pollution, and the
implicit pollution subsidy is likely to be large. The welfare distortions due to excessive
pollution are likely to be serious also if the benefits from additional environmental capital
are large compared to the benefíts of a higher level of pollution. In particular, more
investment in natural capital yields substantial benefits if natural capital is valuable
compared to man-made capital (i.e. the share q~„1V~q„rM is large, see (16)) and if the long-
run benefits of a better environmental quality are not discounted heavily (i.e. r is small).
A low input share of pollution in output, w, indicates that pollution provides only a small
contribution to production. Hence, the benefits of pollution are small.
4.2. An analytical solution
(18)
The effects of an unanticipated, permanent reduction in pollution at time t-0 can be13
analysed analytically by linearizing the model around [he initial balanced growth pa[h.
'The initial steady state is characterized by Ihe various elasticities and shares contained in
Table 4. Tildes denote relative changes from this steady state, so s-dxlx. The permanent
shock to the system that we consider is an exogenous reduction in pollution (permits), i.e.
the dynamic system is driven by P(t) -Pc 0, t~ 0.
The linearized model is saddle-point stable and can be solved recursively." Two
stable roots determine how rapidly the economy converges to a new long-run equilibrium
with balanced growth. In solving the model recursively, we can solve first for natural
capital and the so-called aggregate variables, which describe the behavior of the aggregate
economy. These latter variables include the rate of return, the growth rates of
consumption, man-made assets, and aggregate output. Finally, we determine the solution
for the rclative variables. These variables involve the allocation of economic activity over
the two production sectors and include the capital-knowledge ratio, Klh, the share of
capital and effective pollution allocated to the Y-sector (i.e. u and v, respectively), and
the output share of the H-sector, which provides a measure for the public sector.
The behavior of the aggregate variables during the transition is characterized by
only one of the stable roots, S~-EN, which can be interpreted as the adjustment speed of
the ecological system. In particular, the ecological system converges slowly to a new
long-run equilibrium if a better environmental quality exerts only small adverse effects on
the absorption capacity of nature (see also section 5.1).
The aggregate variables evolve monotonically over time as their behavior is
described by only three elements: the short-term (or initial) effect, the long-term effect,
and the rate of convergence, b:
X,~(t) - xm(O)e -er t XT(~) (1-e -et) , (21)
where xm can be read as N(t), r(t), q,,(t), g~(t), g,,,(t), or g,(t).
In contrast to the aggregate variables, the relative variables (including KIh, u, v,
8K. 8n) may feature non-monotonic behavior; their behavior during the transition depends
not only on the speed of adjustment of the ecological system but also on that of the two-
sector production block. In particular, these variables develop according to:
( e -er - e Ar








Just like the initial effect z"(0) and the long-run effect z„(oo), Ti~ is solved as a
function of the exogenous shock to the system. If 7~x is zero (or if ]`-S), s„ evolves
monotonically at rate i`. The parameter J~, which is the second stable root of the
linearized system, amounts to the speed of adjustment of the two-sector production
system. This rate of convergence indicates whether the outputs of the two sectors are very
different and hence whether the transformation of the two produced goods into one
another is costly. In particular, the production system adjusts more quicky if the outputs
of the two production sectors are more 'similar' (as reflected in a smaller difference
between Q and a).'Z
The term T~ introduces the possibility of non-monotonic behavior. It reflects
temporary effects due to the interaction between the economic system (with adjustment
speed i`) and the ecological system (with adjustment speed S). If T~ is positive, z„ is
temporarily higher compared to the situation in which it converges monotonically to its
long-run value at rate ~. If 7'w is negative, it is temporarily lower.
12 Also higher rates of return and growth speed up convergence. With faster growth,
the desired long-run ratios of growing variables can be achieved more rapidly because
"depreciation" is higher. Similarly, with a high rate of return, output and investment
flows are large relative to the asset stocks (see (6)). Hence, the economy can adjusts its
asset portfolio rather rapidly.ls
5. Comparative dynamics
This section investigates the analytical solutions for a number of major economic
variables. To identify the economic intuition behind our analytical results, we analyze two
specific cases in more detail. In the first case, the environment is a public consumption
good so that the environmental benefits accrue entirely in the form of environmental
amenities (i.e. aY-aH-aN-O). In [he second case, the environment is a public capital
good. Hence, benefits take the form of only beneficial productivity effects (i.e. ~-0).
We focus on the case in which productivity effects are distributed symmetrically over the
two production sectors (i.e. aY-ay-aN). The case in which the productivity effects are
asymmetric (a,.~aH) is rather complicated. Moreover, it is not very relevant for the main
points of the paper. Therefore, the discussion of this case is provided in small letters, so
that the reader may skip these sections.
5.1. The quality of the environment
A lower flow of pollution gradually enhances the s[ock of natural capital:
N(t) - (1 -e-ar)N(~). (24)
The long-run effect on the quality of the environment amounts to:
E P
N(~) - -eP - -(EPN P.
l x
(25)
The larger the positive impact of lower pollution on the accumulation of natural capital
(i.e. -EP is large) and the smaller the diminishing returns in natural growth processes (i.e.
-EN is small) are, the more effec[ive a lower pollu[ion flow becomes in enhancing long-
run environmental quality.
The stock of natural capital monotonically approaches its steady-state value at the rate
ó--EN. How fast environmental quality converges to its long-run equilibrium depends on
how sensitive natural growth and absorption capacity are to environmental quality. If a
higher stock of natural capital exerts a relatively small adverse impact on the growth of
natural capital, adjustment is relatively slow. This is likely to be the case if the economy
starts off with a relatively low level of environmental quality. In that case, the long-run
beneficial impact is likely to be large whereas the rate of convergence towards the new
long-run equilibrium with improved enviconmental quality is low.16
5.2. Welfare
The welfare effect is given by (see Appendix):






The first term represents the costs of investing in the environment, namely the fall
in production associated with a lower flow of polluting inputs. We call this first term the
crowding out efJ`ect: production is crowded out by the additional investment in natural
capital in the form of a lower pollution flow. The adverse crowding-out effect becomes
more important, the larger the the input share of effective pollution (w, see (10)).
The other two tenns at the right-hand side of (26) represent the benefits of
investing in the environment. The second term stands for the benefits of a cleaner
environment as a public capital good, i.e. the positive income effects due to the favorable
productivity effects associated with a larger stock of natural capital." Since these long-
run productivity gains accrue only gradually, [he long-run productivity term is weighted
by rl, which can be interpreted as [he weight of long-run effects for short-term decisions.
In particular, the steady-state effects weigh heavily if the adjustment speed of the
ecological system, S, is large relative to the net discount rate, (r-g). In that case, the long
run approaches rapidly and is not discounted heavily. Hence, the long-run productivity
effects exert a substantial impact on overall welfare.
The third term at the right hand side of (26) represents the benefits of the
environment as a public consumption good. In particular, it measures the increase in
permanent imputed income from environmental amenities. This term increases in rb,
which measures the importance of environmental amenities in overall utility. Also
environmental amenities accrue only gradually. Hence, just as the second term, the third
term involves the fac[or n.
Substituting (25) into (26) to eliminate to relative change in pollution, we find:
yi'(0) - (~81 d N(~) . (28)
"Here, a,,dV amounts to the sum of the long-run productivity gains in both production
sectors, weighted by the share of the corresponding sector in national product (see (17)).I7
Total welfare increases if and only if the initial flow of pollution exceeds its socially
optimal level. The gain in welfare change is proportional to the initial distortionary
subsidy to pollution, ~(defined in (19)).
Welfare can be decomposed in two components: first, discounted consumption, called
"blue" welfare, and discounted environmental amenities, called "green" welfare. A tighter
environmental policy always benefits green welfare. Moreover, with an initial
distortionary subsidy on pollution, overall welfare improves. However, blue welfare may
fall, so that society faces a trade-off between the blue and green welfare. IL reaps a
double dividend (i.e. not only higher green but also higher blue welfare) only if:
naNE~~. (29)
This condition for a gain in blue welfare states that the beneficial productivity effects of a
larger stock of natural capital should exceed the crowding out effects of investing in
natural capital. For this condition to be met, the input share of pollution in production (w)
should be small, the productivity effects of environmental quality in production (aN)
should be large, environmental quality should be rather sensitive to a reduction in
pollution (i.e. e large), and, finally, the long-run effects should approach rapídly and
should not be discounted heavily (i.e. rl large).
If the environment is a pure capital good, environmental amenities and hence
green welfare are absent. In that case, overall welfare consists only of blue welfare.
Accordingly, inequality (29) must be met for welfare to improve. Productivity effects are
zero if the environment is a pure consumption good (aN-O). In that case, a tighter
environmental policy yields only a single dividend (i.e. an improvement in green welfare)
as blue welfare declines.
5.3. Green income
The stocks of man-made and natural assets are tixed in the short run. Despite the fixed
capital base, real national income, as conventionally measured, declines initially because
of less extractive use of the environment (i.e. a lower flow of pollution):
J(0) - mP. (30)
The lower flow of pollution involves an investment in natural capital. Conventional
income concepts account only for investments in man-made assets and thus abstract from
investments in natural capital. The green concept of income defined in sub-section 3.4, in
contrast, incorporates investments in natural capital (in addition to imputed income from18
environmental amenities) and thus is a better indicator of welfare. Indeed, the initial
impact on green income turns out to be proportional to the welfare effect:
~o) - l ~(T -8) trJ ~~~j
. (31)
Hence, whereas the conventional income measure indicates that incomes declines, the
green income concept, by incorporating the accumulation of natural capital, signals a gain
in income. At the margin, the social benefits of investing in natural capital exceed the
social costs. In other words, the benefits of extractive use of the environment are not
large enough to compensate for the future costs in terms of lower non-extractive use.
The literature has established the link between welfare and green income only in
the context of exogenous growth models and undistorted economies (see, e.g., Hartwick
(1990) and Máler (1991)). Our model, in contrast, incorporates endogenous growth by
explicitly modelling endogenous technological advances. Moreover, we allow for a
distorted economy as pollution is excessive from a social point of view in the initial
equilibrium. Our results indicate that, even in a distorted economy with endogenous
growth, welfare can be measured by a properly defined measure of green income.
5.4. Consumption
The effect of environmental policy on the path of consumption, which is a non-stationary
variable, is fully described by the initial jump in the level of consumption and the impact
on the growth rate of consumption. As an aggregate variable, the growth rate of
consumption develops monotonically through time (see section 4.2 and, in particular,
expression (21)). Hence, its behavior is captured by the long-run and short-run growth
effects and the rate of convergence S(discussed in sub-section 5.1). This sub-section first
discusses the effects on, respecively, the long-run growth rate, the short-term growth rate
of consumption, and the initial jump in the level of consumption. At the end of this sub-
section, we use these results to explore the entire consumption path.
a. Long-term growth
In the long run, consumption, income (as conventionally measured), and man-made assets
grow at the same rate. The (steady-state) Keynes-Ramsey rule (2.1) reveals that the long-
term growth impact is directly related to the long-term effect on the rate of return:19
I árJ
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(32)
The long-run effect on growth is ambiguous. Long-run growth rises in the long run if the
productivity effects are important (i.e. aY and ay are large) and if pollution plays a only a
minor role in production (i.e. R and a are large). In that case, the positive productiviry
impact of a higher stock of natural capital more than offsets the negative productivity
effects associated with a reduced flow of pollution.'"
If the environment is a pure consumption good, growth unambiguously declines. If
the environment is a pure capital good, however, long-run growth generally improves if
the tighter environmental policy is welfare improving.15 This contrast illustrates the
importance of the distinction between the consumption-good and capital-good features of
the environment.
b. Short-run growth
The short-run growth rate of consumption follows from the (out-of-steady state) Keynes-
Ramsey rule (1.11), which reads in linearized form:
88~ - -~N } ao~rr } ~N ~' (33)
" For a more extensive discussion of the long-run effects on growth, see Bovenberg
and Smulders (1993).
15 We can write (32) as:
r7~) -~ fqaNS-~1l
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where we have used (1-a)I(1-afa)-w~~(r-gi-~), and the definition of aN in ( 17) and
q~llq~,l in (11). The expression in square brackets is positive if the inequality in (29) is
satisfied (since 1` 10, rl c 1, see (23) and (27)). Hence, as long as productivity shocks are
symmetric, an improvement in welfare implies that long-run growth improves. If
productivity effects are heavily biased towards the consumption-goods sector (aY1 Ja„),
welfare effects are small, and consumption is important compared to investment (i.e. r-g
is large), long-run growth may decline. Intuitively, in that case, welfare gains are realized
by a large boost in short-term consumption associated with rapid improvements in the
productivity of the consumption goods sector, rather than by a boost in long-term
consumption (i.e. growth).zo
If the environment is a pure capital good (~-0), the rate of return on capital
markets is the only determinant of the growth rate of consumption. The initial impact on
the rate of return is given by:
1-a l d
r~o) - (1-a;~l 1 - r;(~-a)(r.8) (aY -aN) E,P (34)
The rate of return declines in the short run unless productivity effects are heavily biased
towards the consumption-goods sector. This decline is due to the adverse productivity
impact of a lower flow of polluting inputs. Indeed, the return declines substantially if
pollution is an important input into production (i.e. ~ and Q are small). Due to the drop
in the initial rate of return, consumption growth slows down in the short run. However,
after its initial downward jump, the rate of re[urn and thus the growth rate of
consumption recover. In [he long run, both the rate of return and the growth rate exceed
their initial steady-state values (see sub-section 5.4.a).
If productivity effects are asymmevic (a,xaN), the rate of remrn may rise in the short run. This cxcurs
only if the productivity effects are large (i.e. aY is large) and heavily biased towards the cunsumption-giwds
sector (i.e. araN is large), occur rapidly (i.e. ó large), and are not discounted heavily (i.e. r is small). If these
condi[ions are met, the productivity in the final goods sector increases fast. As a consequence, consumption
goods become rapidly cheaper over time compared to knowledge. Intuitively, investment in natural capital makes
consumption goods easier to produce compazed to man-made investment goods as time gces on. The anticipa[ion
of lower future prices for consumption goods raises the return on delaying consumption.
The short-run re[urn may even ezceed the long-run rate. In panicular, the return may overshoot its
long-run equilibrium value if the produc[ivity effects aze concentrated in the capital-goods sector, environmental
quality improves rapidty, the rate of return (i.e. the discount rate) is small, and pollution accounts for an
importan[ share in production. Only in [his case are the expected capital gains on knowledge important enough to
raise the short-run return above the long-run effect.
If the envirotunent is a pure consumption good (i.e. a,.-a„-0), the short-run
growth rate of consumption depends not only on the rate of return but also on the change
in envirortmental quality (see (33)). The firs[ term in (33) represents utility smoothing.
With rising environmental quality, material consumption can decline if consumers desire
to maintain a constant stream of utility over time (i.e. complete utility smooting). Indeed,
the first term stands for intratemporal substitution between material consumption and
envirotunental amenities. The second term stands for intenemporal substitution. If a~~0,
households accept lower current streams of utility in return for (sufficiently) higher future
streams of utility. The terms in square brackets represent the 'green' return on postponing
utility governing this trade-off: the physical rate of return on saving (r) enables
households to consume more produced consumption goods in future, while the rise in
environmental quality allows consumers to benefit from a higher marginal utility on
consumption of produced commodities.
With the intertemporal substitution elasticity smaller than unity, a rising level of
environmental quality reduces the growth rate of consumption. The reason is that21
intertemporal substitution is more difficult than intratemporal substitution.1ó Intuitively,
as a result of utility smoothing, households find it attractive to move their consumption of
commodities forward in anticipation of a higher future quality of the environment. By
consuming more initially, they compensate for the relatively low level of utility [hey
derive from the environment in the short run." Indeed, wi[h a relatively low
intertemporal elasticity of substitution, consumers value a stable stream of felicity.
Without productivity effects, the rate of return declines on impact (see (34)).
Hence, short-run consumption growth unambiguously drops if the environment is a
consumption good. Intuitively, households are encouraged to shift their material
consumption to the present by both the rising path of environmental amenities and the
lower return on saving.
c. The initial level of consumption
The short-run jump in the level of consumption is given by:
c7o) - w(ol o~l( r~[(1-~)r7~) t~lrT~)~ ` n~N(m)l.
t r -g f
(35)
The first term represents the positive income effect due to the gain in welfare. The second
term stands for intertemporal substitution effects. If the future rate of return is expected
to be high, households shift their consumption stream away from the present towards the
future. The intertemporal substitution elasticity governs the sensitivity of intertemporal
consumption decisions with respect to movements in the return. The term in long square
brackets summarizes the rate of return on postponing consumption. Since the capital-
market return, r, develops monotonically, the time path is characterized by three
elements, the short-run effect, the long-run effect, and the speed of adjustment from the
short run to the long run. The weight of the long-run impact is given by rl (defined in
(27)): the higher the adjustment speed is relative to the discount rate, the more important
the long run becomes. The last term in square brackets represents the intertemporal
substitution effects associated with higher environmental amenities in the future. In
particular, the anticipation of more future environmental amenities raises the marginal
16 The intratemporal elasticity of substitution equals unity, see also foo[no[e 10.
" Hence, if a~ c 1, a high growth rate of environmental quality is associated with a
low growth rate of consumption so that material consumption and amenities act as
substitutes over time. However, if a~~ 1, intertemporal substitution dominates utility
smoothing so that c and N are complements over time. This can be easily checked from
(1.1): U~NG(~)0 if a~G(1)1.22
utility of future consumption, thereby raising the return on delaying consumption. In fact,
the terms in square brackets represent the `green' rate of return relevant for intertemporal
substitution of consumption. The amenity effect causes this green rate to exceed the
conventional rate of return.
Expression (35) for the initial jump in consumption can be written as:
c~~) - (1 - o~JW(0) . o~r (Q-a)r 1r7~).
lrt(~-a)gJ
(36)
Consumption generally increases because income effects dominate intertemporal
substitution effects. In particular, with the intertemporal elasticity being smaller the unity,
the income effects of a better environmental qualiry offset the intertemporal substitution
effect associated with a better future quality of the environment and hence a higher
marginal utility of future consumption. Only if the intertemporal substitution is close to
one and the consumption-goods sector is much more pollution intensive than the
envirotunental RBcD sector (i.e. Q- a is large), may short-tvn consumption decline.
Intuitively, if consumption is relatively pollution intensive, the production of capital goods
is relatively pollution extentive. Hence, compared to income, the rate of return benefits
substantially from a tighter environmental policy. Therefore, the intertemporal substitution
effect associated with a higher return may offset the income effect, especially if the
intertemporal allocation of consumption is quite sensitive to the rate of return.
d. The overall consumption path
Figure 2 contains typical consumption paths18 following a tightening of environmental
policy. The dotted line represents the consumption path in case the environment is a
consumption good. In that case, consumption typically jumps up on impact, reflecting the
gain in overall welfare. However, the growth rate of consumption drops sharply as the
quality of the environment gradually improves. Although the growth rate recovers as the
growth rate of environmental amenities declines, the long-run growth rate remains below
its initial level.
The unbroken line stands for a rypical consumption path with the environment as a
capital good and symmetric productivity effects. Also in this case, consumption rises on
impact, reflecting the increase in welfare. Moreover, just as in the consumption-good
case, the growth rate declines on impact and gradually recovers. However, if the
environment is a capital good, the long-run growth rate exceeds its initial steady-state
value. In this case, the level of consumption may exceed its level on the initial growth
1e Recall that rs is the (logarithmic) deviation of the initial balanced growth path.23
path at each point in time.
5.5. income and saving
Income is a non-stationary variable. Just as the consumption path, the development of
income (as conventionally measured) is described by four elements: the initial level effect
(see expression (30)), the long-tetm growth effect (see (32)), the adjustment speed b(see
section 6.1), and the shcrt-run growth effect. Since all but the last element have been
discussed before, this sub-section explores the short-run effec[ on income growth before
discussing the overall income path.
The growth rate of national product (conventionally measured) is determined by
the growth of both man-made and natural assets:
g,(O) - g~o) }` s 1 N(O) - g~o) } l g 1a"N(~)
(37)
The right-hand side of (37) can be interpreted as a green measure for aggregate saving
because it includes saving in the form of not only man-made but also natural assets.
The short-run growth rate of man-made assets (which can be viewed as saving as
conventionally defined) is affected by the initial changes in national product and
consumption:
ggM(0) - rJ(0) - (r-g)e(0) (38)
-- q~raN f(r-8) ~]N(~) t a~[(1-r))rr~0) f rrrrï~) f n(r-8) ~1V(~ ]~
A tighter environmental policy typically harms the accumulation of produced assets
in the short run. Intuitively, the economy adjusts its asset portfolio away from man-made
towards natural assets. In particular, the first term at the (second) right-hand side of
expression (38) indicates that consumption smoothing hurts saving (in the form of man-
made assets, i.e. saving as conventionally measured); in the anticipation of future
productivity and amenity gains, households consume more, thereby reducing saving in
man-made assets. Hence, large welfare gains as a result of improved environmental
quality widen the contrast between reduced growth of man-made assets in the short run
and increased growth of these assets in the long run. The second term in square brackets
at the (second) right-hand side of (38) represents intertemporal substitution. The first term
in these second square brackets may cause saving to decline on account of intertemporal24
substitution.
By substituting (32) and (34) to eliminate, respectively, the short-run and long-run
effects on the rate of return, we arrive at:
88M(0) --(1-a~ q~raN t(r-8) ~~N(~) f o~r( 1-a 1 P
ll-at~J
- o (r 8)(~3-a) l( I-a l( ó l r(aY-aN)N(~). (39)
` rt(~-a)8 Jll -atQllrtíQ-a)(r.ó)1
If the environment is a consumption good, the growth of man-made assets unambiguously
declices. Intuitively, saving, as conventionally measured, is hurt by the consumption
boom on account of both a lower rate of return and utility smoothing. For similar
reasons, the accumulation of man-made capital generally declines also if the environment
is a capital good.
Only if productivity gains are heavily biased towards the environmental RBcD sector, intertemporal
substitution is relatively easy, welfare gains are small, and consumption is imtx~rtant compared tn investment
(i.e. r-g is lazge) may the accumulation of man-made assets benefit. In that case, the productiviry gains are
concentrated in the pure investment sector. Hence, a tighter envirottmental pulicy ezerts a relatively lazge
positive impact on the rate of return, thereby reducing consumption on account of intertemporal substitution
effects. The drop in short-run consumption crowds in investment. If productivity effects are biased towards the
consumption-goods sector, in convast, the drop in conventional saving is especially large as short-run
consumption rises substantially (see sub-section 5.4.b).
Substituting the growth rates of man-made and natural assets (from (39) and (24),
respectively) in (37), we find for the initial growth rate of income:
88~(0) - n(ó~to~r)aNN(~) t o~r( 1-a ~p -(r-8)~(1-o~vW(~) `1-a-~J`




Together with long-run income growth (see (32)), the adjustment speed S, and the initial
level effect (see (30)), expression (40) characterius the adjustment path for income.
Figure 3 contains typical adjustment paths for income following a tightening of
environmental policy for the two cases that the environment is either a consumption or a
capital good.
Environment as consumption good
L.ong-run growth declines in case the environment is a public consumption good (i.e.25
aN-O, see subsection 5.4.a). Short-run growth declines even more because households
raise consumption and hence reduce saving in anticipation of future amenity gains. Hence,
following the initial drop in income, the gap between income on the initial balanced
growth path income and income on the new path widens. Intuitively, households rely
more on environmental amenities and less on consumption of produced goods as a source
of utility.
Environntent as ca~itatgood
If the environment is a capital good (i.e. ~-0), environmental policy improves long-run
growth unless productivity gains are heavily biased towards the consumption-goods
sector. In particular, if productivity gains are symmetric, growth improves in the long
term. Hence, although income dec(ines initially (see (30)), in the long run income exceeds
its level on the initial balanced growth path.
Expression (40) reveals that income growth improves not only in the long run but
also in the short run if the rate with which natural capital accumulates exceeds the growth
rate on the initial balanced growth path (i.e. ó1g)19. Intuitively, the accumulation of
natural capital more than offsets slower accumulation of man-made capital. The short-run
boost to growth may even exceed the long-term increase in growth if the intertemporal
substi[ution elasticity is small. This kind of result is familíar from exogenous growth
models where level effects are more important than growth effects.
Growth may decline in the short run, however, if the improvement in
environmental quality occurs only slowly.20 In particular, if intertemporal substitution is
small and the initial growth rate exceeds the rate of convergence of the ecological system
(i.e. g 1 S), growth declines initially. Intuitively, natural capital accumulates slowly
compared to man-made capital while a small intertemporal substitution eiasticity reduces
the intertemporal substitution effects associated with a higher long-run return.
The case with a decline in short-run growth is especially interesting because of the
sharp contrast between long-run and short-run impacts on growth. In particular, although
a tighter environmental policy may raise welfare and long-run growth, such a policy
19 With ~-0 and ay-aN we may write (40) as (use (25)):
88,t(~) - n(ó -g)aNIV(~) - v~r~ t)aNS - w~P - a~r[~r -(1-a)~(1-a t~f)]P
The two terms in square brackets are positive (see (29) and (10)) so that the entire
expression is positive if S 1 g.
2" This is likely to be the case if the initial quality of the environment is small, see
also section 5.1. An alternative interpretation of a small value for S is that stock-flow
pollution problems account for a large share of environmental problems or that the time
dimensions of ecological systems are large compared to that of economic systems.26
harms short-run growth. Conversely, a less ambitious environmental policy may boost
short-term growth. However, this growth canno[ be sustained in the long run.
5.6. The knowledge intensity of production
The evolution of the overall knowledge-intensity of production, K~h, indicates the
direction of technological progress. Altetnatively, it can be viewed as an indicator for the
composition of man-made assets and, in particular, for the relative size of private versus
public capital. If productivity effects are symmetric, the capital-knowledge ratio can be
written aszt:
-e~ a,l
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Environment as consumption good
If the environment dces not improve productivity, the long-run capital-knowledge ratio
declines declines for three reasons (see Bovenberg and Smulders (1993)).ZZ First,
compared to capital, polluting-saving knowledge is a better substitu[e for pollution if the
substitution elasticities between capital and effective pollution are smaller than unity.
Accordingly, pollution saving technologies rather than private capital acts as the most
Z' The appendix derives an expression for the case with a,.~a,,.
u The conditions for this result to hold are that the knowledge-creating sector is
relatively more capital intensive (i.e. Q~ a) and the substitution elasticities between
capital and effective pollution in the two sectors do not exceed unity. In this paper, these
conditions are assumed to hold.27
important substitute for pollution. Second, the reduction in the economy-wide flow of
pollution harms output in the pollution-intensive sector, i.e. the capital-goods sector, the
most. Hence, the accumulation of capital rather than that of environmental technologies is
most heavily damaged by a more ambitious envirottmental policy. Third, without
productivity effects, the rate of return and hence the growth rate falls. This hatms activity
in the pure 'investmen[' sector, i.e. the environmental RáD sector. Since this sector is
capital-intensive, the aggregate demand for capital and hence capital-knowledge ratio
declines.
The beneficial effects on amenities impact the transition path but leave the long-
run equilibrium unaffected. In particular, amenity effects cause a more rapid initial
accumulation of pollution-saving technologies relative to private capital. The reason is that
amenity effects cause households to consume more initially. This provides a boost to dte
consumption-goods industry and, since this sector is pollution-intensive, also to the
development of pollution-saving technologies. Later on, as these effects reverse
themselves, consumption becomes less important compared to investment. The associated
move of resources towards the pure investment sector (i.e. the H-sector), which is capital
intensive, stimulates the accumulation of private capital relatively to [ha[ of pollution-
saving knowledge and hence slows down [he upward [rend in the knowledge-capital ratio.
In fact, the knowledge-intensity of production may develop non-monotonically if powerful
amenity effects produce a targe enough temporary consumption boom (i.e. a~ small and ~
large so that T,t.h has a large (negative) value). Whereas the capital-knowledge ratio
declines initially, it may start to rise in the later phase of the transition when the growth
rate of consumption, and hence output growth in the pollution-intensive consumption-
goods sector, slows down. However, it ends up below its ínitial steady-state value.
Environment as capital good
If a better environmental quality improves productivity, the long-run decline in the
capital-knowledge ratio is reduced. In fact, the capital-knowledge ratio may rise rather
than fall on the new balanced growth path. Intuitively, productivity effects raise the rate
of return and the growth rate. This pulls activity away from the consumption-goods sector
and toward the pure 'investment' sector, i.e. thc knowledge-creating sector. Since this
latter sector is capital-intensive, the overall economy relies more on capital, as reflected
in a higher capital-knowledge ratio. Consumption smoothing strengthens these effects:
Initially, households reduce saving in the anticipation of future productivity gains. As
time goes on, productivity gains are in a large part saved rather than consumed. Hence,
in the long run, the economy becomes oriented less toward consumption and more toward
investment. This benefi[s the capital-intensive environmental RBzD sector, which is a pure
investment sector.28
The positive impact of the productivity effects on capital-intensity can cause non-
monotonic behavior of the capital-knowledge ratio during the transition. Initially, the rate
of return is low as the crowding out effects of lower pollution flow dominate the positive
productivity effects due to a larger natural capital stock. Hence, the forces encouraging
pollution-saving technologies (discussed above) dominate. Moreover, the development of
pollution-saving technologies is stimulated by a high level of consumption due to the
anticipation of future productivity gains because the consumption boom benefits the
pollution-intensive consumption-goods sector. As time elapses, however, the accumulation
of natural capital causes the rate of return and the level of output to recover. This stimu-
lates investment and saving and hence the environmental RBtD sector. Since this sector is
capital-intensive, the capital-knowledge ratio increases during the later phases of the
transition and may, in the long run, exceed its initial steady-state value.
With asymmetric productivity effects, a long-run rise in the capital-knowledge ratio is even more likely;
by raising the produc[iviry of the capital-producing sector, environmental policy ezpands the supply of capital,
thereby makittg production more capital intensive.
These effects strengthen possible non-monotonicities as the improvement in the produc[ivity of the capital-
producing sector occurs only gradually. Hence, initially, the factors discussed above may dominate, causing pro-
duction to rely less on capital and more on pollution-saving technologies. When the qualiry of the environment
improves, the capital-producing sector becomes more productive, thereby making capital more abundant
compared to pollution-saving knowledge.
There is one ezception to this scenario, namely if intratemporal substitution is low, inter[empural
substitution is relatively high, the input share of' pollution in the Y-sector is large, adjustment of natural wpital is
rapid Isee appendix, expression (H.13)J. In that case, households delay consumption in anticipation of cheaper
future consumption. This provides a temporary initial bctost to the capital-intensive investment sector, thereby
initially stimulating the accumulation of capital rather than of pollution-saving knowledge.
5.7. Resource allocation: the size of the pubóc sector
A tighter environmental policy changes the production swcture in terms of the relative
size of the two production sectors. This sub-section explores two indicators for the
relative size of the environmental RBcD sector, which can be viewed as the public sector
since it is financed with public means. The two indicators for the relative importance of
the public sector we consider are, first, the income share of the environmental RBcD
sector, q,,HIq~J, and, second, the share of pollution allocated to this sector, Z„IZ-1-v.
These variabies are related to the effective capital-knowledge ratio and the price of
pollution-saving technologies, q,,, in the following way:
v- 1I-vILP
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v-u ` l ~-a f29
(~~l -(1-w81L
-(1lv tI1 - ~~-aorl(QhtÁH-Áy)J
.
l J ` r 1 1l-vl l a 1
(46)
The price of knowledge is constant if productivity shocks are symmetric [see appendix
(C.19) and (C.20)]. If in addition the substitution elasticities in both sectors are equal (i.e.
a,.-aN-a„}, expressions (45) and (46) can be written as:
1 v 1 (K-h) t(1-o t~ a) -P
(1-v) - (v-u)[ " (1-at~)
iI
(qn 1 - (1 - ~gl (11(K-h) t ((1-0~(1 -(Q-a)1 t




The initial impacts are found by setting the relative change in the capital-knowledge ratio
equal to zero (K-h-0). Expressions (47) and (48) reveal that environmental policy
expands the size of the public sector in the short run. The reason is that the decline in
pollution changes makes effective pollution scarcer compared to the other input into
production, i.e. private capital. This reduces the size of the pollution-intensive sector (i.e.
the Y-sector) but boosts the pollution-extensive H-sector.
The magnitude of the initial expansion of the public sector depends on the
intrasectoral substitution elasticities between capital and effective pollution, aY and aH.
The relative size of the public sector increases most in the short run if the economy is
rigid, i.e. if intrasectoral substitution is difficult. Intuitively, intrasectoral substitution of
resources substitutes for intersectoral substitution. In particular, if the productivity effects
are not biased towards the Y-sector, a more ambitious environmental policy makes
consumption goods, which are the pollution-intensive good, more expensive. Hence,
moving resources away from the Y-sector, which produces these goods, becomes less
attractive. If the intrasectoral substitution elasticities do not exceed one, intrasectoral
substitution towards capital is not strong enough to cause the capital-producing sector to
expand. Intuitively, in that case, pollution-saving technologies rather than capital are a
better substitute for pollution. Hence, resources move to the sector developing pollution-
saving technologies.
The move ot' factors to the H-sector is strengthened if productiviry effect.c are biaxed toward the Y-
sector. In that case, the ezpected future scarciry of pollution-saving knowledge puts upward pressure on the30
short-run price of that knowledge. This make it even more attractive to employ factors in the environmental
RBcD sector in the short run.
b. Transitional and long-run effects
We now turn to a discussion of the effects during the transition and in the long run. If
productivity effects are not asymmetric, the development of the sectoral allocation of
resources through time reflects the adjustment of the aggregate capital-knowledge ratio
(see expressions (47) and (48)). By substituting the long-run solutions for the capital-
knowledge ratio and the price of knowledge, we find for the long-run impacts:
I ~~v7~ -- ~(1 -od)I (aY aH)N(~) p~ -(dlr7m).
`1-v ` 1-af~ lr-fll
(49)
9ti ~ 1-v (r-H) () 1 á l l
Q~ (~) - (1 -
~l `
a(1-oY) tQv(1-oy)1 ~ a
1-at~i
-P~
{ ~ 1 r-álr~~)J
(50)
Environment as consumption good
Following the initial move towards the environmental RBrD sector, resources start to
return to the Y-sector. The reason is the stock-flow dynamics of investments in pollution-
saving technologies: the investments in RBr.D gradually expand the stock of pollution-
saving technologies and thus the economy-wide ratio of effective pollution to capital. The
larger relative supply of effective pollution boosts the pollution-intensive sector, i.e. the
private sector. Moreover, in the absence of productivity effects, the rate of return decli-
nes. This harms the environmental RBcD sector, which is a pure investment sector, and
pulls resources towards the consumption-goods sector.
Expressions (49) and (50) reveal that, despite the recovery of the share of resour-
ces allocated to Y-sector, the public sector remains relatively more important on the new
balanced growth path compared to the situation in the initial equilibrium if the intertempo-
ral substitution elasticity and the substitution substitution elasticity in production between
effective pollution and capital are small. Intuitively, to substitute for pollution, the
economy invests mainly in pollution-saving technologies instead of ei[her investing in
private capital (which would happen if intrasectoral substitution would be easy) or
consuming (which would happen if intertemporal substitution would be difficult).
Although amenity effects affect neither short-run and long-run effects, they do
impact the transition. In particular, amenity effects may result in a temporary move of
resources into the consumption-goods sector, thereby boosting the income share of the31
private sector (i.e. the Y-sector). The reason is that amenity effects cause an initial
consumption boom as households shift their consumption forward in anticipation of
improved future amenities. When the consumption boom peters out, resources move back
into the pure investment sec[or, i.e. the H-sector. Hence, [he relative size of the public
sector may develop in non-monotonic way. Following an initial shift towards the
pollution-extensive public sector, resources may start to return to the consumption-goods
sector, after which they move again to the environmental RBtD sector.
Environment as capital good
If a better environmental quality enhances long-run productivity, investment becomes
more attractive in [he new steady state. Hence, in the long run, more resources are drawn
into the environmental RBr.D sector, which is the pure investmen[ sector, thereby boosting
the income share of the public sector.
During the transition, the income share of the public sector may develop in a non-
monotonic way, mirroring the non-monotonic behavior of the capital-know(edge ratio. In
particular, in the short run, more resources are allocated to the poliution-extensive RBcD
sector. However, the share of resources allocated to environmental RBcD gradually
declines as the accumulation of pollution-saving technologies favors the pollution-intensive
sector, i.e. the Y-sector. Moreover, consumption-smoothing and intertemporal substitution
due to a low initial return result in a relatively high level of consumption compared to
saving during the initial phases of the transition. This temporary consumption boom pulls
resources into the consumption-goods sector. These developments expand the private
compared to the public sector.
During [he lat[er phases of the [ransition, the rate of return recovers over [ime,
thereby stimulating saving and investment. Moreover, due to consumption smoothing, a
large part of the productivity improvements are saved. These developments favor the pure
investment sector, i.e. the public sector. Hence, the income share of this sector starts to
rise again.
If pruductivity effects are biased towards the Y-scctor, the public sector becomes even more important
in the long run. In particular, compared to the supply of private capital, the supply of effective pollution is fur-
ther reduced. This makes it more attractive to allocate resources to the sector developing pnllution-saviug
rechnologies and boosts the income share of the public sector.
These asymmetric productivity effects oecur only in the long run. This explains the non-monotonic
behavior of the sectoral resource allocation. In the very short run, the pullution-extensive RBtD sector expands.
As knowledge about pollution-saving technologies accumulates, the effective pollution-capital ratio recovers,
thereby encouraging resources to move towazd the pollution-intensive private sector, especially because the rela-
tively low productivity level makes consumption attractive.
As the improvement in environmental qualíty occurs, however, the improved productivity of the capital-
goods sector, makes effective pollution, and hence pollution-saving technologies, more and more scarce. Hence,
resources return to the environmental RBcD sector.32
5.8. The share of pollution costs
A tighter environmental policy changes the distribution of factor payments over the two
rival inputs, i.e. pollution and private capital. In particular, the share of expenditures on
pollution permits in national income, which represents the revenue share of the
environmental agency in national income, equals:
(Q~l - (1-~)IP - (K-h) t
lAr~ N qF1J. l J ` a
(51)
Comparing expression (51) with (45) reveals that the development of the revenue share is
closely related to that of the share of pollution allocated to the environmental RBcD
sector. Indeed, in the short run, the revenue share falls. Since resources move to the
pollution extensive sector, the aggregate economy relies less on pollution. Therefore, the
rise in the price of pollution is not sufficient to offset the adverse impact of a lower level
of pollution on the revenue base of the pollution tax, and the revenue share thus falls. In
the medium run, resources move back to the pollution-intensive sector. Hence, pollution
becomes a more important input in aggregate production and the national income share of
expenditures on pollution rises. If the environment is a pure consumption good, this share
rises in the long run. However, pollution revenues may fall in the long run if the
environment is a pure capital good. In that case, the economy relies more on investment
goods, which are less pollution intensive than consumption goods.
In the short run, the cash flow of the environmental agency declines as revenues
from pollution permits fall whereas the size of the environmental RBcD sector increases
(see section (5.7). In the long run, national income share of the agency's cash Flow
equals:
a~á rPP








If the environment is a pure consumption good, the long-run cash flows rise as a fraction
of national income. This reflects the increased pollution intensity of the economy due to a
shift from investment towards pollution intensive consumption. If the environment is a
capital good, in contrast, the pollution intensity of the economy falls as environmental
RBcD becomes more important. As a consequence of higher spending on RBr.D and lower
revenues from a more pollution-extensive economy, the agency's cash flows may decline
as a fraction of national income.34
7. Conclusions
Using an endogenous growth model, this paper analytically computed the transition to a
new steady state following a tightening of environmental policy. Our results indicate that
the production sector may adjusts in a non-monotonic fashion to a tightening of
environmental policy. Initially, more resources are devoted to developing pollution-saving
technologies. As more pollution-saving knowledge becomes available, resources move
towards the pollution-intensive consumption-goods sector. However, over time, the
economy becomes less oriented towards consumption and more towards investment. This
pushes resources back into the RB~D sector.
A tighter environmental policy induces a change in the composition of the
economy's asset portfolio away from man-made assets towards natural capital. Of the two
man-made assets included in our model (i.e. pollution-saving technologies and other,
private, man-made capital), capital is hurt most during the initial phases of the transition.
One reason is that pollution-saving technologies are a better substitute for pollution than
capital. Also the initial consumption boom contributes to lower capital accumulation
because consumption goods are produced in a pollution-intensive (and thus capital-
extensive) fashion. In the later phase of the transition, however, the economy focuses
more on investing and less on consuming. This favors the accumulation of capital because
investment (in the form of RBtD) relies relatively heavy on capital.
We s[ressed the case in which pollution is excessive in the initial steady state. In
that case, the growth effects of a tighter environmental policy depends crucially on
whether the environmental benefits acciue in the form of amenities (i.e. in the form of a
public consumption good) or in the form of higher productivity of the production
processes (i.e. in the form of a public capital good). If the environment acts mainly as a
public consumption good, a tighter environmental policy reduces growth both in the long
and the short run. In this case, society faces a trade-off between, on the one hand,
produced consumption goods, and, on the other hand, a higher quality of the environ-
ment. Short-run consumption declines, albeit less than output, so that the accumulation of
man-made assets is reduced. In this case, households rely on environmental amenities
rather than produced goods as a source of utility. Accordingly, the production sector of
the economy becomes less important.
If the environment acts mainly as a public investment good, long-run growth rises
as a result of a more ambitious environmental policy. Anticipating long-run productivity
gains, households raise short-run consumption despite a decline in initial output. Accor-
dingly, saving declines, thereby harming the accumulation of produced assets. If the
accumulation of natural capital occurs relatively slowly, the reduced accumulation of
man-made assets hurts short-run income growth. However, if the ecological system35
adjusts rapidly, short-run growth rises as a result of rapid accumulation of natural capital.
In that case, following an initial drop, output quickly recovers and exceeds its initial
steady-state path relatively soon. Hence, the benefits of environmental policy acctue
rapidly and accue in the same form as the costs. Indeed, in this case, households continue
to rely relatively heavy on the consumption of produced goods as a source of utility.
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Mathematical Appendix
This appendix provides the deriva[ions of all results in the tezt. First, we derive the steady state ratios given
in section 3. Nex[, we indicaze how the model is linearized. Finally, we reduce the linearized model to the
system of differential equations displayed in table 3, and solve these differential equations recursively.
A. Steady state ratios [(5)-(l1), (la)-(16)j
From table 1, last column, and the identities in (2) and (3), we can derive the relevan[ steady state ra[ios in
terms of r, g, d, ar eb, p, a, and ó. In particulaz, we find subsequently v in (8) from (1.12'), rPPIY from
(1.9'), 9~,FIIY from (1.8'), u in (7) from (1.7'), and YIK from (1.10'):
rrP (1-a)r
Y - r~l -~)g
4r~ - (2 -a)8
Y r~7-~)8
Y z rr r~l -~)8 l.




Equation (9) follows from (A.I) and (A.2). By using (1.4') and (2), we can write the share of knowledge in
man-made assets as:
9~h (4wGVY)
4~ - (9~~ t8(~)
(A.4)
Substitution of (A.2) and (A.3) into (A.4) yields the second equality in (10). Using (2) and (1.3'), the
consumption to man-made asset ratio can be writtrn as:
4~ s lKl(4~) - ` 1e -8~(1 -q,~l
(A.5)
Substitution of (A.3) and (10) into (A.5) yields (5). Using (3), (I.4'), and (2), we can find the income to
man-made asset ratio:
9~ 9,~ t ( Yl( K 1~~ 4wh Ig , Y(1 - 4~ 1.
9~ L 4~ 1K1119,~J 4r~ll Kl 9~J
Substitution of (A.3) and (10) yields (6). The share of the environmental RBcD sector in total production can
be written as [using (I.4')1:37
9wH - g( 4wh 1( 9~1.
9,~ 19,~J19,~ J
(A.6)
Hence, we find (11) by substituting (10) and (6) into (A.6). The share of pollution in production can be
written as ~using (3)j:
r~ Y ( T~lI1 - q~HI
Y qrf - l Y I` 4~ 1
(A.7)
Substituting (A.1) and (A.6) into (A.7), we find that vPPIq,J-w as stated in (10).
Substituting (13) and N-0 into (12), and nezt substituting (5) and (6), we can write the ratio of green
income to man-made assets as:
qeP - ~C . q~ - ~(r-8) ' r~
4~ 9~ 4~
We find (14) after dividing (6) by (A.8) and arrive at (IS) after dividing (5) by (A.8).
Finally, we may rewrite (1.14') as:
H l
~[~ 4~ 4 4~1ar 9,J }
ag 4~J
- r-g .6
Substitution of (5), (6) and (17) into (A.9) yields (l6).
B. Linearizing the mtxlel
(A.8)
(A.9)
Tabel 3 contains the linearized versions of the equations in tables IA and IB.' Equation numbers
correspond, i.e. (2.2) is the linearized version of (L2), e[c. Moreover, lineazization of (2), (3), and (12)
yields (2.15), (2.16) and (2.17), respectively.
Variables with a tilde (') denote relative deviations from the initial steady state':
z(!)odr(t)Ix(t) or dx-xi. (B.1)
All tilded variables depend on the time indez t, which is ommitted where this dces not lead to confusion.
The lineariiation procedure for the static relationships (e.g. production functions (2.3a), (2.4a), trtazginal
conditions (2.7), (2.8), definitions (5) and (6p is straightforward. However, some remarks on linearization
procedures for dynamic relationships in an endogenous growth model are in order. Stationary variables, i.e.
variables that are constant in the steady state, should be distinguished from non-stationary variables, i.e.
t (1.13) and (1.14) are not used since P is set suboptimally, see section 3.5.
z The only ezception to this rule is W(t7), see section F.3R
variables of which the growth rate is constant in the steady state. The growth rate of a stationary variable,
say s,Ix„ reads in linearized form3:
d(~t~xt) - xt
where a dot denotes the time derivative. In the long-run, when a new steady state is reached, zl -p.





d(~~x2) - RB,~~ (B.3)
In the long-run, the new steady state growth rate may differ from the initial growth ratc since growth is
endogenous. Hence, in gencral 8~ (a,) ~p. In our model, all non-stationary variables (except Q) grow at thc
common rate g in the steady state, i.e. giz-g. Hence, the ratio of two non-stationary variables, say x11 and
xZZ, is stationary. The relative rate of change (or growth rate) of such a stationary ratio can be writren as the
difference of the growth rates of the two non-stationary variables:
~x:f~xxx
I
d - x:r~xu - 88~~ - 88~'
x1i~xn
(B.4)
As an illustration of the linearilation procedures for stationary and non-stationary variables, we
derive (2.11) in table 2 step by step. Differentiation of U(c,N) in (1.1) with respect to time gives:
il~ `
Uc '-~ óc I C '~(l -óflN.
The total derivative reads:
d(U~U~ --(ó`ld(~~c) t~(I -ó`ld(N~)
(B.5)
(B.6)
' If we denote initial steady state variables by superscript i and vaziables deviating from this initial
steady state by superscript d, we may write from (B.I):
xa-x'(1 tx). (i)
Differentiating this ezpression with respect to time, we find
id - s~(l.x~ . x~z. (ii)
Ifx is stationary, z-0 and hence lineari7ation of sIx azound the initial steady state gives:
d(X~ - xdi-sdz - ze-xt x~z - ze
lx xi xt xt x~ . (iii)
Substituting (ii) into (iii) and noting that.i-p, we arrive at (B.2).39
Consumption c and marginal utility U~ are non-stationary variables, whereas environmental quality N is
stationary. Hence, using (6.2) and (6.3), we may write (6.6) as:
d(U~1U~ - -(Ic188"~ ' ~(1 -~IÍJ.
l oJ ( aJ
Taking the total derivative of (1.11) and substituting (8.7) and dr-rr, we arrive at (2.1 I).
(B.7)
C. Environmental quality, the price of knowledge and the rate of return [(2a), (25),
(32), (34)J
The firs[ differential equatiun in table 3 directly follows from loglinearizing (1.2), see (2.2). It is a
differential equation in a single endngenous variable, N, which can be solved as:
N(r) - -(1 -e -~`) eP~
where ó--EN, and e is defined in (20).
Combining (2.7) and (2.8), we arrive a[:
1 (Ky -Zr) - ~ (Ky -Zy)'
oy ay
Combining (2.Sa) with (2.6a) and (2.Sb) with (2.6b), we find respectively:
Ky -Zy -!C -h -P tu -v~
Ky-Zy-K-k- ~I~ulu . (2vvlv
Substitu[ing (C.3) and (C.4) in (C.2) and (2.7) and solving for u and G, we derive:
(1-u lf( var'(l -v)ay
u - 1 I l1
) (Ar-,ty-4~ - (K-h-P) .
v-u Q-a
v v u ~ - a (Ar -Ay - 9r,) - (K -h -p) .
- ~'-v~ I~YOy{(1 -u)Oy~ ~
Substitution of these two relationships into (C.3) yields:
á (Ky -Zr) - I 1 a1









Substitutíng (2.10), (C.2), and (C.7) into (2.12), we find:
( J-a.~ l q"A - r Ay -Áa -P




Substitution of (2.3c) and (2.4c) yields the second dynamic equation in table 3. Since N is already solved
(see (C.1)), this differential equation contains q,, as the only unknown variable. We solve it by using
l,aplace transforms (cf. Judd, 1982). In particulaz, [he Laplace transform of a variable z is defined as:
Ly(s) - ~s(t)e a~.
0
The Laplace transform of the time derivative of a variable s is:




To simplify notation, we rewrite the second dynamic equation in table 3 by collecting all terms not
containing rjh in .iq and denoting the root by p:
4n - Ir9~ ' xo ~
where
sq ar aH rN(t) - rP.
- -~ ~-a





The Laplace transfotm of (C.11) is:
(s-P)Lq(s) - L~(s) ' 4w(O). (C14)
To find the initial change qh(0), we use the condition that L4~ is bounded for s~0. Under our assumption
(3~a, this implies that the RHS of (C.1 f) should be zero for s-p ~ H 1-ntQ)I((3-rY)10. Hence:
9.(~) - -L~(F~) - - jx,(:)e-w~.
0
(C l5)
Substituting (C.1) into (C.12), we observe that zq converges monotonically at rate ó to its long-run value,
cf. (21). Hence, we can write its Laplace transform as:41
L,(s) - fXq(I)C ~~ - Xq(~) -À~q( ) } xq( 1
Jo stá s
Substituting (C. l5) into (C.14) and using (C.16) to rewrite the Laplace transforms, we derive:
-s.ó(x9(oó4xg(
)1 - s(xq()1. ~4(S) - J l J v r~
(C.16)
(C.17)
Inverting the Laplace transform, we arrive ar.
- f -( xy(0) -io()1 - (Xy(~11 -
4"(r) Il l á-~ J l N Jl`
f -xg(~l(1 -e-a,) (C.18) l
k
J
Hence, qh develops monotonically at rate d (cf.(21)). The first (, second) term in square brackets in (C.18)
represents qn(0) (, rj~,(or')). Substituting (C.12) in (C.18) gives:
Qq(0) - P-a ~0) f P-a 2 á (ar-a~e P, (C.19)
(1-a) -ll-at~)[ - r.(t8-a)(rtó) -
9ti() -
f (~-a) - (ar -ax) e ~
p.
` 7 -a'~
The rate of return follows from (2.10) and (C.7):
1-a




Substituting (2.3c), (2.4c), (24) and (C.19) [,(C.20)] we arrive at (34) (,the second equali[y in (32)]. The
first equality in (32) follows from (2.11) and (24).
For later use, we find an ezpression for the difference between the long-term and short-term rate of
return. From (C.21), (C.19), (C.20), (2.3c), and (2.4c), we arrive ar.
rT1 -rÍ0) - Ar() - U -a)B,. (C.22)
where
B, ~ 9w(0) -4r,() ' At~i) -AH() - ( rró
1rar~r,)N() ~
~-a lr~(0-a)(r.á)J
D. The growth rate of man-made assets
(C.23)
Rewrite (2.3b), apply ( l.3'), and arrive at:42
8~r - K(Y-K) - KI(~-~N) ' (M-K)~ (D.I)
Substituting Y from (2.3a), eliminating ZY using (2.6a), and substituting M-K--m(FC-h) [from (2.ISa), (2),
and ( IO)] we derive:
88r - K~ATt~(Kr-Zp).v.P-(K-li)~ - K(~-M) . Kw(g-ti).
Analogously, substi[uting (2.4a) and (2.6b) into (2.4b) and multiplying by g, we find:
8~w - SIAB ~~(Kg-Z~) - vv rt pl ` I -v
Substitution of equations (D.2) and (D.3) into (2.ISc) gives the growth rate of man-made assets:
Ll
S~w (YlAr t q~ AN (Cl(e -M) -
19~1 quM - `9e~1
{




Using (C.3) and (C.4) to eliminate the sectoral factor intensities and substituting q„HIq,rM-wg [see (6) and
(11)], YIq~1-r-~g [see (3), (tí), (11)], and CIqMM-r-g [see (5)], we find for the second row of (D.4):
rP . ~a(r-ra8)'~~8~(x-h-ptu-v)
- Ir(I -ar)~(K-h) - ~~8 ~l~ t fr - 1-~8rvl S - ~rP.
1-u J l 1-v 1
(D.5)
By substituting (7), (8), and ( 10), it can be seen that each term in square brackets equals (1-m)r and that all
terms other than those containing P cancel. Hence, after substituting (2.3c), (2.4c), (5), and (6), we can
write (D.4) as:
SSr - r~aNN t ~P~ - (r-8)(c`-M), (D.6)
where aN is defined in (17).
E. Consumption [(33), (35)~
The growth rate of consumption as given in (33) directly follows from (2.11).
Thc consumption to man-made capital ratio evolves over time according to ~cf. (B.4)~:43
crM - 8(8~ - 8u)' {E.1)
Substitution of (D.6), (2.11) and (C.21) into (E.1) yields the [hird differential equation in table 3, where the
first row of the matrix in [able 3 and (2.3c) and (2.4c) have been used. To solve this differential equation in
the unknown variable t-M, we proceed along the same lines as in solving for q~. In particulaz, collect all
[erms other [han c-M in .r~:
x~ - o~rr t (o~-i)~N - r[~P.a~v~-
so [hat d(t-M)Idt-(r-g)(t-M)t~,.. The Laplace transform reads:
(s-(r-8))LtE-.w!(s) - Lr(s) ' cjo)-M(o).
(E.2)
(E.3)
Since M is a predetermined variable, M(0)-0. Ltr.M~(s) is bounded for s-r-g~0. Hence, the LHS of (E.3)
is zero for s-r-g, which gives rise to:
cÏo) ' -L~(r-8) ' - f s~ e{`Yk~. (E.4)
0
Since z~ is a combination of variables that develop monotonically at rate ó(cf. (21)), also 3~ dces. Hence,
we can solve the integral in (E.4) as:
x~() x~(o) -X~() 1
c7o) --~~ - r~}ó --(~~)[U-n)x~(o) t nx~(1], (E.5)
where n-èl(r-gtS), see (27). Substituting (E.2) for ~~ and noting that N(o) - óN(~ [from (24)] and that
S(1-rl)-r1(r-g) [from (27)], we arrive a[:
cj0) -~~~1[mP.na~( )~ t O~N(Í- a~L(~r8)[(1-'r)rT~)r'1rT~) ' n~1y()~. (E.6)
[In section F below, we will derive that the first three terms amount to welfare W(0), so that (E.6) can be
written as in (35).] Substituting (E.4) into (E.3), rewriting the Laplace transforms in a similar manner as in
(E.5), and inverting yields a similar equation as (C.18) and (21). Hence, the consumption to man-made
assets ratio develops monotonically at rate ó. Its long-run value [also found by setting d(~(~)-M(oopldt-(r-
g)(d(oo)-M(o~))-FZ~(w) equal to zero) is given by:
cj) -Al() ' -r`~ ) - (rr81~rwP.a~V() - o~rj)~. (E.7)
For later use, we subtract (E.6) from (E.7) and use ó(I-q)-n(r-g):aa
[R)-M()]-c70) -(~-~)~(raN-~ó)~1( ) - o~[rr()-rrZO)-~óN( )]~.
1 r-g
F. Welfare [(2ri), (35), (36)~
Welfare at time r-0 [see (l.l)~ can be written as:
W(0) - ~ l c(O)t-U'` j [ N(t)~t-y'a t -M`i ] dt.
- (1-I~o~ I o
where R(t) is the cumulative growth-corrected discount rate, defined as:
R(t) ~ j[dt(1rv~-I)B~(r))dr
0
Total differentiation of (F.2) yields:
r






Since g~ is the sum of vaziables that develop monotonically according to equation (2t) [see (2.11)), also g~
dces. Hence, we can solve the integral in (F.3) as:
RR(r) - (l~o~ -1)8~8~( it rt [t{(~) -8~()]I 1 -t ~)] ` ó
(F.4)
Initial welfaze is given by (1.1') while R(t) on a balanced growth path is (r-g)t [see (1.11')~. Hence, we can
linearize (F.I) as:
dW(~) - w(~)(~ -Iro~G'(O) . W(0)(r-8) j ~~(~ -I~a~N(t) -RR(t)~t~.-rx~.
0
Using (C.l) and (F.4), we can solve [he integrals in (F.5):
j ly(t) t -t.-rx ~ - N( )f~ - ~ l - 4 N(~ ~
o Lr-8 r-8'óJ r-8
j~(t) t i~-rx dt -(llo~ -1)g 8~(Í ( 8~(D) -8~() l( I 1 ll




Substitution of (F.6) and (F.7) into (F.5) yields for welfare':
I 1 1 d w(y) ~ w(o) - eTV) .(g1[(i -'))8~(0) t ns~()] - m[nN()] -
I 1-1~o~J W(0) 1 r-81
(F.8)
Eliminating g~(0) and g~(~), using (2.11) and noting from (24) that N(0) - óN(~ and from (27) that ó(1-
rl)-r1(r-g), we find (35). Substituting (E.6) into (35) to eliminate c(t7), we find (26). (36) is derived from
(26), (32), (34), and (E.6).
G. Conventional and green income [(30), (31), (37), (38)]
Income J is given by (2.16a). Substituting (2.3b) and (2.4b) and subtracting M, we find:
J -M - ~ (c-M) . ~ (Sa.K-M) t ~ (8e.h-M). (G.1)
Eliminate M(in the second and third round brackets) using (2.15a) and substitute the appropriate shaze
ezpressions [see (5), (6), (10), and (I1) and note that KBIq~.J-g(KIq,aM)(q,wM~q~.l)-g(1-q„Ie~qwM)(q,NMIq~J)]
to arrive ar.
J-M -(r-81(c-M) r(2 i)8(gtrrv(K-h)] t TB~g"w-(1-rv)(~-6),.
The terms with K1 -h canlcel whereas gM cant be substituted from (2.15c) [and using (10)] so that:
j- M. r r-81 (c-M) t 8g"M.
1 r J r
(G.2)
(G.3)
In fact, (G.3) is the loglinearized version of J-MtC. For t-0, (G.3) yields the first equality in (38) (as
M(0)-0). We find the second equality in (38) by substituting (E.6) to eliminate t(0).
Substitution of (D.6) into (G.3) yields:
j - a~Jy- . rwP . M (G.4)
Substituting M(0)-N(0)-0, we arrive at (30). Applying (D.2) and (D.3) to (G.4) we derive:
SSi ' a~~J . taP . 88r.
(G.5)
4 W is defined as W~dW(0)I[(1-llo~)W(0)] so that W70 if welfare rises [note from (1.1') that WG(1)0
if a~C(~)1].46
With constant pollution (i.e. p-p), we arrive at (37) ~see (C.I)J.
By substituting (13), (14), (IS), and (A.8) imo (2.17a), noting that q,,,NIqQQ-(q,~JVIqMM)I(qt,QIqMM) we find
for green income:
Q' ir.~(r-8)l~ t lr ~~8)IN ~ Ir. 1 ) 4~ IV. 4}(r -8) 4xb1)
(G.6)





Substitution of (28) into (G.7) yields (31).
H. Kapital Knowledge ratio [(al)-(aa)]
The ratio KIh evolves over time according to ~use (B.4), (2.ISc), and (]0)J:




Substituting (D.3) and (D.6) to eliminate g,, and gM respectively, and eliminating KN ZH from (C.2) and
(C.7) and 9 from (C.6), we derive:
K~h - (Íl~l~r~a„JV'~P~ -B~AN.P1 - (r~)(~-M)~
t( 1 1 f -if8o rArAe~"J
ll-rrJ l` r~ ~-a
(v~laJ Ar~ a~"J
-(~ 1(K h P)1
(H.2)
where a„ is defined in (44). Collecting terms and subs[i[uting (2.3c) and (2.4c), we arrive at the third
equation in table 3, where:




where (7), (8) and (]0) have been used to establish the second equality.
L.et zk collect all terms other than -)`(K-h) in the differential equation for KIh in table 3:47
xk -(~l~lfr~a~V.r.rP~ -8~tt'P~ -(r~I(c`-61) t ~Pl
` J`




so that d(FC-h)Idt--k(K-h)tzR. The Laplace transform of this equation reads:
(s..i)Gtx-ti~(s) - ~~(s) t x(0) -h(0).
(H.4)
(H.5)
Both K and h are predetermined variables. Accordingly K(0)-h(0)-0. z~ is a combination of vaziables that
develop monotonically at rate ó. Hence, also sk dces. Consequently, we can write the Laplace transform of
x, in (H.5) in terms ofzk(O), zk(m), s, and ó[use (C.16)]:
1 xc() 1 x~0) -xe(1
L~~{s) - (sr,i) -s } ( s..l) s.A .
Inverting the Laplace transform in (H.6), we arrive at:
r -u - -rk
K-h - I sk~ ) (1 ~ -u) t ~st(~) -xk(1~ e ó -~1
(H.6)
(H.7)
Hence, the tirst and second terms in square brackets represent the long-run solution for K-h and its
temporary part, TR.h, respectively [cf. (22) and (41)]. Substi[u[ing (E.7) lo eliminate c-M in (H.4) we find
for t-oo:
K() -h() - s~ ) - P . a,~A~
) ~a)-4e(~l
t r (t9-a)g lf a~rrT) - (Án( Í tP) - ~oAI A~
)-Aa( )~Ir,()11 (H.S)
lar'(~-a)gJ` g l ~-a JJ
We arrive at (42) by eliminating qh(~) from (C.20) and rewriting the term in squaze brackets. In particulaz,
note from the steady state version of (C.8) that:




Note from (C.21) and (H.9) [hat:
(H.9)
o r ( o~r-g l (Ay( ) -ÁH( ) -P (H.10)
8 rÍ)-
l 8 l~ ) }[A~
1 -(1-a)I I 1-a~~ ~'
Substitu[ing (H.9) and (H.10) in[o (H.8), no[ing from the Ramsey rule that (o~r-g)Ig-r9l(r-~9), (and se[ting48
Ár-Ág), we arrive at (42).
To find the temporary part TR-h, we substract XR(oo) from z~(D) [see (H.4) and (H.7)]:
T[-av - z~(o)-i,t( ) - (Í l~)~-ran~V"( ) . (r-s~cT)-A!(1-cT0)] F Sa~()~
8 v a~ -~og B,.
- 1-or v-u )
(H.I1)
where B, is defined in (C.23) and where we have used (2.4c). By substituting (E.8), (C.22), and (2.3c), we
find:
(I -~)Ttai ` -ra~jv() . (1-4) ((raN-~á)N() -odraylV()-r(1-a)B,-~óN( )~ )
t BagN( )- 8(v or -~agl8,
`v-u I
(H.12)
By using aK(1-wg~r)(aYaH)-ay and aNt(~glr)(a,-aH)-aY and eliminating u, v, a~, and B, [by using (7),
(8), (44), and (C.23) respectively], we find:
(1-w) Tf~ ' - ~ (r-8)ag -(2 -n)(rag-~á)(I -o~] N()
-S~U-toBMtU-7)o~~](ay-ag)N( )
(1-rl)(l -a)ro~ . r~1-~)S ao t(~ -~)8 o l( r.ó - - ~-a y t6-a ~ gJ1rt(Q-a)(r.ó))(ay-ag)N(
)





The first term (first row) in (H.13) gíves the temporary part if productivity effects are symmetric (ar-a„).
Substituting the detinition of n(see 32) and noting that a,r-g-o~á [see (1.11')], we arrive at the expression
in (43). The second and third terms in squaze brackets are positive if the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution is low. Hence, if aYaH~O, TR~ is most likely to be negative for N(m)--eP)0. The temporary
part is large in absolute value, if productivity effects are heavily biased to the consumption goods sector,
factor substitution is large, and if intertemporal substitution is small.
I. The size of the public sector [(a5)-(50)]
The share of pollution allocated to the environmental RácD sector, equation (45), is derived in (C.6). From
(2.16a), (2.16b) and (11), we find:
rjr . H - 4r - J - (1 -~B I (9~ rt H - ~ ~ (I. I )
1 r)49
Substitntion of (2.3a) and (2.4a) yields:
q'~ .H -9i -J - (1 - ~81 ~4e 'An -Ár . ~(KA-Z~ - a(Kr-Z~ . Zy -Zr~ . (I.2)
Using (C.2) and (C.7) to eliminate the sectoral factor intensities and using (2.fia) and (2.6b) to eliminate ZY
and ZH, one finds (46). If productivity effects and substitution elasticities are symme[ric across sectors,
Ar-Ax. 9n-P(R-a1~(~-~}R) [see (C.19) and (C.20)], and or-a„-a, jsee (44)]. Substitution of these
conditions into (45) and (46) gives (47) and (48). Substituting (H.8), (H.9), and (H.10) into (45) and (46),
we arrive at (49) and (50).
Loglineazizing the income identity q~.1-rKtrPP [see (3) and (4)], using (]0), we find:
Tr.P-4i-J - (1-rv)~irtP-i-K~ (1.3)
Substituting (2.9) and (2.10), and using (C.7) to eliminate KrZr, we arrive at (51). We find the short-run




We find the long-run tax share by substituting (H.9) and (H.8) [o eliminate q,,(~) and K(sp)-h(oo)
respectively from (1.1):
Tr(Í tP -4~) -J() - U -r~)((I -aj - (~ -a)g ~(1-0~1( Arl~ -Ay( ) -Pl




If productivity shocks are symmetric (aY-aN-a„ and Àr-ÀH) and substitution elasticities in production aze
symmetric (aY-a„), we can rewrite (L5), using (32) and (C.20) as:
ir( ) .P -9~) -J() - f (1-o
ar.(1-~)(~-a)8 l , ( U -a)(~-a)8l D ll -P
L ~ r'(~-a)8 1 1 r'(~-a)8 l~r-D)J 1-at~
- ~ (~-a)g ~~d~aN~r().
r.(Q-a)g r-D
The environmemal agency's long-run surplus as a fraction of total production follows from (9):
S ~ ryP -qwH ( r-g TrP
9rf - 1 r ) 4rf
(1.7)
Linearizing (1.7), using (l l) and N(~)-0, we find (52). Substitution of (1.6) into (52) yields the long-run
cash flow quote for symmetric productivity effects and substitution elasticities in production:50
ST,~ f( ar.(J -P)(P -a)8l(1-0 . ( (1-a)U -a fP)l( rd l a l -P
-`1 rt(P-a)8 I ~ 1 r'(P-a)8 11 r-SI ~J J-a'P
(J -a}P) ( 'a o~aNN() ~
- (r.(P-a)8 lr~
J. The time path of non-stationary variables (Figures 2-a)
(1.g)
In the figures we show the time paths for non-stationary variables e and J. We can apply a similar method
as used to derive (F.S) in order to express a non-stationary variable as a function of its initial value, its







Total differentiating (J.2) and noting that g~ develops monotonically according to equation (21) and that
G~(t)-gt in the steady state, yields
~ ( ~l
G~Gt(t) - j8g(T)dT - 8~~()t t (8~(~)-~f ))I J~
1. o l ` ó
We can loglinearize (1.1) as:
c7t) - cZ0) . GG(t) .
Substitution of (J.3) into (J.4) gives the expression
(J.3)
(J.4)
cTr) - cTo) t 8[ST)t '(g(~) -~T1)l
J a~11.
(J.5)
By replacing d and g~ by J and g~ respectively, we arrive at the appropiate expression for the time path of
production. More generally speaking, a similar expression as in (1.5) is appropriate for non-stationary
variables of which the growth rate develops monotonically.51
TABLE lA: structure of the economy
Structure of the economy idem, in the steady sta[e
Welfare W- J e-~ U( c(~),N(t) ) dt (1.1) a~ --( UndU~)-' ~ 0, f-uo
~` ~c(~) N~~ ~ o W-~ ~ í] 1 1
a~ -1 D t{l~o~ -1),q
1-uo o
~ - U„JVIU~c ~ 0.
~ ~ ~c ,Nm~ , U(c N) - (
l 1 - o~
Ecology
N- E(N,P) (1.2) E~, EPg E,,,,,, c ~, N-N(P) (1.2')
E(N(P),P)-0 for PGP~.
Y-sector Y- AY(N)'F(K,..ZY) - C t K (1.3) dA~IdN?0, FRY,FZ,. 1 0. Y-CfgK (1.3')
Fx~.xy., FZyZy G 0,
Fx~,KYtFZYZY-F.
H-sector H- A N K , Z - h - H( )~G( a n)
(1.4) ~y~~z0, F,~„Fu ~ 0, H-gh (1.4')
F,r,,,a„ F,,,,,, G 0,
G,~,K„t G„~„- G.
Resource KYfKdSK (1.5) K,.-uK, KH-(1-u)K. (1.5')
constraints
ZYfZdSZ~hP (1.6) ZY-hvP, ZH-h(1-v)P. (1.6'i52
TABLE 1B: behaviour and markets
Behaviour and markets idem, in the steady state
producers: Ar rJF - qh Ax c3G (1.7) j-u -~ 4hN (1 7') aKr aKg U a Y
.
Ar dF - qh AH r3G (1.8) 1-v - 1-Q 9~
(1 8') aZr aZA v 1-a Y
.
Ar dF h- iP (1.9) T?P - 1-a (1.9')
dZr Y v
Ar ~ -r (1.10) a Y
-r (1.10')
r u K
Consumers: ~- U U- r ~~ ~ (1.11) á t g~o~ - r (1.11')
Environm.
Agency: Ax
aG P { qn - r (1.12) Qg - r ~ (1.12')
azx qh
-
Government: rp - -EPqx ( 1.13) TP - -Er(N(P).P).q ( 1.13')
Ux { dArF } q~ aAyG 1 { 4x } Ex - r
U a a
(1.14) ~ C t aY Y f aH qyH - 6 f g- r ( 1.14')
~ N N qx qx 9xN 4xN 4xNS3
TABLE 2: The linearized model
Lineatization of table IA
N - ENN t (EPP~N)P
Y- Áy t a(Ky -Zy) t Zy
y - ~ C t gY (~r .K)
Áy - aylV




Ka - -[yi(1-u)]u . K
Zysv.htP












Linearization of table IB
Ay' 1-a (Zy-K~ - 9w'Aa' ~-~ (Z~-Ky)
oy o~
Ay- -(Zy-Ky) ' 4~.Ay- ' (ZN-KA)
Oy OH
a
To - Ay - - (Zy -Ky) . h
oy
(1-al
r- Ay i 11 ll
(Zy -Ky)
oy
gg"~ - a~r~ - (1 -oaQN








Linearization of national accounting identities
K l 9t,h h
M- 1 q;~IK } 1qt~
qhh
4y ' ~ q~ 4w
K 9,~
gr - q f gr r q, 8~
1 - ~q~~Y r ~ 4~~H
9~












q (- q~ t ~l (UN-UI (2.lÍb) Q- I qoQ qoQ I d54
TABLE 3: the dynamic system
The diagonal contains the four roots of the dynamic system, denoted by -S, ~-r(1-afQ)I(a-a), r-g, and -~--[rf((3-a)g]~(Q-a),
respectively. There are two positive and two negative roots. If R~ a, the two negative are -S and -~. If a~(3, the two negative roots are -S
and ~. Since the model contains two jump variables (viz. qn and c~11~ and two predetermined state variables (viz. N and K~h), it is
saddlepoint stable in both cases.55
TABLE 4: List of symbols
The equation numbers in this list refer to the equations in the text and tabels that define
the relevant variable.
Ar, A„ total factor productivity in the Y-sector and H-sector respectively; ( 1.3), (1.4).
a„ aH, aN the elasticity of total factor productivity with respect to environmental quality in the Y-
sector, the H-sector and total production respectively; (17).
(ar-(aA~aMA~M.
c, C per capita and aggregate (materíal) consumption (by normalizing thc number of rcpresen-
tative agents to one, we can ignore the distinction between c and C).
g steady-state growth rate of production, consumption, income, man-made capital, price of
pollution, shadow-price of environmental quality.
g; i-c, h, K. M, J, Q growth rate of i, g~~é~c, etc.
H (RBcD)ou[put of the H-sec[or: new pollutíon-saving technical knowledge; (1.4).
h sttxk of pollution saving technical knowledge.
J aggregate real ou[pur (3).
K, KY, K„ Non-environmentat, man-made (reproducible) capital (including e.g. physical and human
capital): the [otal stock, [he stock allocated in the Y-sector and the s[ock allocated in the
H-sector respectively; (1.5).
M aggregate real value of man-made capital; (2).
N environmental quali[y (stock of na[ural capital).
P Flow of pollution or polluting inputs, number of pollu[ion petmi[s.
Q "green" national income: national income corrected for income derived from the environ-
menr, (l2).
q; i-h,J,M,N,Q price (delator) of i in terms of mazginal utility of consumption (e.g., q~, is
the shadow price of pollution saving technological progress devided by the marginal utility
of consumption).
r rate of return in terms of marginal utility of consumption.
u share of capital (K), allocated in the Y-sec[or (u3KYlK); ( 1.5').
v share of polluting inputs (Z), allocated in the Y-sector (v~Z~; ( 1.6').
Z, ZY, Z~~ polluting inputs in production in efficiency units (Z-hP): the total flow, the flow allocated
in the Y-sector and the flow allocated in the H-sector respectively.
n the production elasticity of capital (or share of capital in factor payments) in Y-sector
(~-(dYlaKr)Y~K,.). Due to the assumption of constant returns to scale, 1-n is the
production elasticity of effective pollution in the Y-sector.
p the production elasticity of capital (or share of capita] in factor payments) in H-sector
(R-(aHiBKH)HIK~~); I-p is the production elasticity of effective pollution.
ó sensitivity of the ecological absorption capacity with respect to environmental quality (ó~-
E„).
~ excessive taz on natural capital, or excessive subsidy on pollution; (19).
e long-ryp gJasticity of environmental quality with respect to pollution
(e-(aN1iiF)N~P-EPP~E,,,N); (20).
p indicator for the importance of the long-run in short term decisions; (27).
~9 pure ra[e of time preference; (1.1).
l, rate of adjustment of "relative" economic variables; (23).
a~ intertemporal elasticity of substitution in utility; ( L 1).
aY, a~~ elasticity of subs[itution between capital and effective,pollution in production in the Y-
sector and the H-sector respectively.
rP price of a pollution permit (or the pollution charge) in tertns of produced consumption
goods.
~ the utility value of environmental quality relative to consumption (13).
~, the shaze of pollution in production, and the share of pollution saving technical knowledge
in man-made capital; (10).56
Figure 1: the structure of the model57
Figure 2: the time path for cortsumption
t4ne
------- environment as a pure consumption good (~-1.5, a,.-aN-O)
environment as a pure capital good (~-0, a,.-aX-1)
Other parameter values: g-0.02, 5-0.03, 0~-213, a-o.75, Qao.9, o,-aN-0.8, 5~0.04, e-o.8 ; Ps-10;c
Figure 3: the time path for productiou
~ '
o a e s~~ ~a ~e zi za z7 x A x as .z .e .e ai aa e~ eo ea ee
UTO
------- environment as a pure consumption good (~-1.5, aY-aN-O)
environment as a pure capital good (~-0, a,.-ay-1)
Other parame[er values: see Figure 2.58
Figure 4: the time path for the knowledge intensity KIh
e ~ e s u x u a a a y n n r si v
tlme
Mf
------- environment as a pure consumption good (~-1.5, aY-RN-O)
environment as a pure capital good (~-0, aY-aX-1)
Other paramercr values: see figure 2.59
Figure 5: the time paths for pollution and RáD expenditures
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b. Environment as a capital good
a-~
-e
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~
f f f share of environmental RBcD in production Hfq,;1-q,
o a o share of pollution in production iPtP-J-q,
share of the environmental agency's cash flow in production s.
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